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Introduction: On January 1, 2014, the State of Maryland implemented the Global Budget Revenue 
(GBR) program. We investigate the impact of GBR on length of stay (LOS) for inpatients in 
emergency departments (ED) in Maryland.
Methods: We used the Hospital Compare data reports from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) and CMS Cost Reports Hospital Form 2552-10 from January 1, 2012–March 31, 
2016, with GBR hospitals from Maryland and hospitals from West Virginia (WV), Delaware (DE), and 
Rhode Island (RI). We implemented difference-in-differences analysis and investigated the impact of 
GBR implementation on the LOS or ED1b scores of Maryland hospitals using a mixed-effects model 
with a state-level fixed effect, a hospital-level random effect, and state-level heterogeneity.
Results: The GBR impact estimator was 9.47 (95% confidence interval [CI], 7.06 to 11.87, 
p-value<0.001) for Maryland GBR hospitals, which implies, on average, that GBR implementation 
added 9.47 minutes per year to the time that hospital inpatients spent in the ED in the first two years 
after GBR implementation. The effect of the total number of hospital beds was 0.21 (95% CI, 0.089 
to 0.330, p-value = 0 .001), which suggests that the bigger the hospital, the longer the ED1b score. 
The state-level fixed effects for WV were -106.96 (95% CI, -175.06 to -38.86, p-value = 0.002), for 
DE it was 6.51 (95% CI, -8.80 to 21.82, p-value=0.405), and for RI it was -54.48 (95% CI, -82.85 to 
-26.10, p-value<0.001).
Conclusion: Our results indicate that GBR implementation has had a statistically significant 
negative impact on the efficiency measure ED1b of Maryland hospital EDs from January 2014 to 
April 2016. We also found that the significant state-level fixed effect implies that the same inpatient 
might experience different ED processing times in each of the four states that we studied. [West J 
Emerg Med. 2019;20(6)XX-XX.]
INTRODUCTION
The escalating cost of healthcare in the United States is 
unsustainable. In 2016 spending reached 17.9% of the gross 
domestic product, or $10,348 per person.1 Many studies on 
healthcare reform in the U.S. focus on the factors driving the 
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nation’s high level of expenditure.2-6 The payment system is the 
subject of one major stream of research. 
All-Payers Payment System and Total Patient Revenue
The State of Maryland is at the forefront of healthcare 
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Population Health Research Capsule
What do we already know about this issue?
In January 2014 Maryland began the Global 
Budget Revenue (GBR) program. Its goals 
include improving the health of communities 
and patient experience while lowering costs.
What was the research question?
What was the impact of GBR on emergency 
department performance and efficiency in 
Maryland?
What was the major finding of the study?
At the patient level, GBR implementation 
correlates with longer ED length of stay for 
admitted patients.
How does this improve population health?
Our results indicated that GBR implementation 
had a statistically significant negative impact 
on the efficiency performance of Maryland 
hospital EDs.
reform in the U.S. The state is unique in its implementation of 
an all-payers payment system for hospitals. The system is 
governed by the Health Services Cost Review Commission 
(HSCRC), which sets hospital rates for all providers for both 
inpatient and outpatient services.7 In 1977 the federal 
government granted the state a Medicare waiver that required 
government payers to abide by HSCRC hospital rates. Global 
Budget Revenue (GBR) is a revision of this waiver and was 
implemented in 2014. GBR drives a value-based healthcare 
service by setting global budgets for acute care hospitals, i.e., 
creating a capitated system for hospitals.
In 2011, Maryland implemented the Total Patient Revenue 
(TPR) program, a revenue constraint policy designed by the 
HSCRC. TPR was implemented as a pilot project in 12 Maryland 
hospitals located primarily in rural and geographically isolated 
parts of the state. Under TPR, these pilot hospitals were 
guaranteed a certain annual revenue calculated from a formula 
based on the prior year’s revenue and reasonable annual 
adjustments. This structure provided an incentive to control costs 
by reducing unnecessary hospitalizations and inpatient resources. 
Communities were rewarded for the development of robust 
outpatient resources and improving the health of the population. 
Based on the success of TPR, the state and federal government 
moved forward with GBR on a statewide basis.
Global Budget Revenue 
On January 1, 2014, the State of Maryland began the GBR 
program with the main goals of improving the health of 
communities, improving the patient experience, and lowering 
the cost of healthcare services for all patients. In contrast to the 
36-year-old waiver policy that preceded it, GBR guarantees a 
hospital’s annual revenue by calculating global budget based on 
market share. Adjustments in global budgets are tied to changes 
in market share and the state’s gross domestic product. In some 
ways, GBR is an extension of TPR. However, GBR is not a 
voluntary program; it requires every Maryland hospital to 
participate. The main difference is that TPR was implemented 
in geographically isolated areas of the state where catchment 
areas are clear. Hospitals under GBR operate in more 
competitive market environments.7 In the online appendix, 
Table A1 lists the names of the Maryland hospitals that are 
under the GBR program. 
In the past, hospital revenue was directly linked to the 
number of medical services that the hospital provided. In contrast, 
under GBR and TPR, each hospital’s total annual revenue is 
defined by the HSCRC and known at the beginning of each fiscal 
year. The hospital margin is the difference between the global 
budget and annual cost. As a result, hospitals are motivated to 
control costs while maintaining or growing market share.7-10
Medicaid Expansion
Medicaid is a state and federal jointly-funded healthcare 
insurance program for low income Americans. The Medicaid 
program was expanded to individuals with annual incomes below 
138% of the federal poverty level when the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (also referred to as the Affordable Care Act 
[ACA] or Obamacare) was passed. Maryland is one of 33 states 
that adopted the Medicaid expansion. This ACA provision was 
implemented on January 1, 2014, 10 days before GBR began.
Emergency Department Efficiency
Emergency departments (ED) have taken on an increasingly 
important role in the healthcare system and are often cited as a 
key contributor to rising costs.8,11 The ED is an important 
hospital-based service; GBR, because of its focus on cost control, 
could have an impact on ED efficiency. We selected the length of 
stay (LOS) or ED1b (efficiency measure); see online appendix 
section A3) for admitted patients as our dependent variable. LOS 
is a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) metric 
designed to measure the impact of hospital throughput on ED 
patients. Multiple studies document the deleterious effect of 
prolonged ED stays on quality of care.12-14
Our research focused on the impact of GBR on ED 
performance and efficiency in Maryland. Our study was 
confounded by the nearly simultaneous implementation of 
Medicaid expansion with GBR. To control for the effect of 
Medicaid expansion on Maryland’s EDs, we compared our 
results with three geographically proximate states that had also 
adopted Medicaid expansion: West Virginia (WV), Delaware 
(DE), and Rhode Island (RI).  
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METHODS
Data
GBR was implemented on January 1, 2014. Our study 
period ran from January 1, 2012–March 31, 2016. We define 
January 1, 2012–September 30, 2013, as the pre-treatment 
period and April 1, 2014–March 31, 2016, as the post-treatment 
period. The six-month gap between September 2013 and April 
2014 is omitted from our study and represents the transition 
period of GBR implementation and Medicaid expansion. As we 
used publicly available, administrative datasets that do not 
include data about individuals, institutional review board review 
was not sought.
Data Sources
The overall data for our study combines three datasets. The 
first dataset uses data from the CMS Cost Reports Hospital 
Form 2552-10.15 This form is generated by Medicare-certified 
institutional providers and is required in order to achieve 
settlement of costs (in total and for Medicare).15 From the 
variables available in these reports, we chose TOTAL_
HOSPITAL_BEDS, which is the total number of hospital beds 
during the fiscal year. 
The second dataset is the CMS Hospital Compare data.16 
This dataset has a variety of reports about the quality of care 
delivered by hospitals. We used two of these reports: 
Emergency Department Throughput before July 17, 2014, and 
Timely and Effective Care after July 2014. These reports 
contain many measurement scores including ED1b. We used the 
hospital-level ED1b score as our main outcome variable and 
state-level annual reports to describe the trend among the four 
states studied. Table 1 presents the CMS Hospital Compare data 
reports that we used and their measurement periods. 
GBR agreements were signed on July 1, 2013, and 
hospitals were able to extend the implementation deadline until 
October to make modifications. This means that hospitals could 
have implemented GBR at different times, so we designated a 
six-month window (October 1, 2013–March 31, 2014) as the 
treatment implementation period.
The third dataset is the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) 
database.17 KFF is a non-profit organization focusing on 
national health issues that provides data for policy analysis and 
research. The data and reports that we used were the following: 
Hospital Beds per Thousand Population 2012-2015,18-20 Hospital 
Emergency Room Visits per Thousand Population 2012-2015,21 
and Total Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment 2011-2015.22 
These data and reports all provide state-level information.
Merging the data gave us a total of 353 ED1b reports from 
Maryland, WV, RI, and DE from January 1, 2012–March 31, 
2016. There are 24 reports from DE, 135 from Maryland, 44 
from RI, and 150 from WV.
Methodology 
In this study, we used the difference-in-differences method 
(DID), which is widely used in healthcare management and 
policy analysis.23-28 DID determines two differences and 
calculates the treatment or policy effect by determining the 
difference of the two differences. Examples of studies using DID 
include that work by Tiemann and Schreyogg on the impact of 
privatization on hospital efficiency in Germany.27 Buchner et al. 
used DID to study the impact of health system entry on hospital 
efficiency and profitability.28 
In our study, the first difference is the comparison of a 
GBR, hospital’s performance before and after GBR 
implementation. The second difference is the comparison of 
scores from a group of control hospitals in the same time frame. 
Finally, we used the second difference from the control group to 
rule out the part of the first score difference that is not 
influenced by GBR. This allowed us to estimate the treatment 
effect within the treatment group. More precisely, GBR 
adoption was considered the treatment, the hospitals 
implementing GBR constituted the treatment group, and 
hospitals not implementing GBR but otherwise similar (in their 
adoption of Medicaid Expansion, for example) were considered 
the control group. This allowed us to identify the treatment 
effect due to the impact of GBR as opposed to Medicaid 
expansion or other industry-wide trends.
The treatment group was all Maryland hospitals that 
adopted GBR on January 1, 2014, but did not participate in the 
TPR program. According to the Annual Report on Selected 
Maryland General and Special Hospital Services Fiscal Year 
2016,10 Maryland has 46 EDs located in general hospitals. Of 
those 46 hospitals, 10 rural hospitals have participated in the 
TPR program since July 2010 and are, therefore, excluded from 
the analysis. The control group includes hospitals from WV, RI, 
and DE. These three states adopted the original Medicaid 
expansion on January 1, 2014, at the same time as Maryland, 
but did not implement the GBR or TPR programs. The main 
reason that we chose these three as our control group is that 
Medicaid expansion might have caused and been accompanied 
by some unmeasurable changes in patient behavior. For 
example, people who were newly eligible for Medicaid after the 
expansion would have had different strategies for choosing 
healthcare providers. We assumed that people from the four 
states exhibited similar patterns in their reactions to Medicaid 
expansion. The online appendix section A2 provides the logic 
behind the selection of the control group.
Report ID Measurement period
20130701 1/1/2012-9/30/2012 (pre)
20140717 10/1/2012-9/30/2013(pre)
20151210 4/1/2014-3/31/2015 (post)
20161219 4/1/2015-3/31/2016 (post)
Table 1. CMS Hospital Compare data report dates and measurement 
periods.
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Model and Setup
We formatted the final dataset into an unbalanced panel 
dataset and implemented a mixed-effects, linear regression model 
with a state-level fixed effect, a hospital-level random effect, and 
state-level heterogeneity to investigate the impact of GBR 
implementation on the ED1b scores of Maryland hospitals. The 
variables considered in our model are listed in Table 2 (see online 
appendix sections A4 and A5 for more details on our model).
Sensitivity Analysis
We conducted three types of sensitivity analysis. The first 
analysis assessed whether our treatment effect estimates were 
sensitive to the length of the first report period. In our study, we 
used four CMS Hospital Compare data reports. The first report 
covers the nine-month period from January 1, 2012 –September 
30, 2012, and the remaining three are 12-month period reports. 
Then, we introduced the report length into the model for the 
sensitivity analysis.
Second, to assess whether our estimates were sensitive to 
each state in the control group, we conducted three sensitivity 
analyses using three alternative control groups. In the first 
alternative control group, we removed the hospitals in WV 
counties with smaller populations (less than 45,000), since 
Maryland counties in our study have at least 45,000 residents. 
This left 18 WV hospitals in the control group. In the other two 
alternative control groups, we removed all hospitals from RI and 
then from DE. Third, we conducted a robustness check on the 
relationship between the number of hospital beds and resulting 
ED1b score by dropping hospitals with more than 500 beds. 
RESULTS
Model Results 
Table 3 summarizes some general information about the four 
states involved in our study. 
Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates under the panel data 
setting with mixed effects, clustered error on the state level using 
generalized least squares (GLS). The estimated coefficient of the 
variable tt (GBR impact estimator) was 9.466872 with a 
p-value<0.001, implying that GBR had a statistically significant 
impact on ED LOS (ED1b) in Maryland’s GBR hospitals. On 
average, GBR implementation added 9.47 minutes per year to the 
time hospital inpatients spend in the ED after controlling other 
factors in the model. As shown in the results, WV (wv coef. = 
-106.9579, p-value = 0.002) had the best overall ED1b 
performance, and RI (ri coef.=-54.47875, p-value <0.001) 
performed the second best among the four states. 
The significant p-values of variables wv and ri, which are 
state-level, fixed-effect variables, imply that patients admitted 
through EDs with similar medical problems and conditions from 
WV, RI, and Maryland might experience significantly different 
time in EDs. The effect of the total number of hospital beds (bed 
coef. = 0.2096206, p-value = 0.001), which is positively 
associated with ED1b scores as shown in Figure 1, provides 
strong evidence that the bigger the hospital, the longer the ED1b. 
The time variable (t coef. = 1.393201, p-value <0.001) implies 
that during our study period, the hospitals’ ED1b performance, on 
average, became worse overall in all four states. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
In the first sensitivity analysis, we introduced the report 
length into the model. The regression estimator for length (length 
coef. = -1.341053, p-value = 0.384) implies the shorter time 
period in the first report does not impact the ED1b score. (See 
online appendix, Table A9.) In the second sensitivity analysis, we 
introduced the total number of registered nurses per thousand 
population and the hospital beds per thousand population at the 
state level to describe the changes in available healthcare 
resources. Table 5 summarizes the sensitivity analysis estimates 
for the GBR effect. The regression results show that adding the 
two new variables or using the three alternative control groups is 
consistent with our main results. The incremental time estimate 
for each model in Table 5 is approximately nine minutes. 
Fourth, after dropping hospitals with more than 500 beds, 
the number of hospital beds (bed coef. = 0.270943, 
p-value<0.001) is still positively associated with a hospital’s 
ED1b score. Online appendix section A6 provides the details of 
the sensitivity analysis.
DISCUSSION
At the patient level, GBR implementation correlates with 
longer ED LOS for patients being admitted to the hospital. We 
believe that this implies that GBR has fundamentally changed the 
way emergency physicians and hospital staff approach the 
hospitalization decision. The Evaluation of the Maryland All-
Variables Description
ED1b Hospital’s ED1b score
ri Indicator variable for Rhode 
Island
wv Indicator variable for West 
Virginia
de Indicator variable for Delaware
bed Number of beds in the hospital
t Time 
period Indicator variable for post-
treatment period 
tt GBR impact estimator
medicaid Medicaid enrollment 
percentage of the population 
in each state
edvperpop Hospital emergency 
department visits per thousand 
population of each state
const Constant 
Table 2. Variables considered in our model.
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Payer Model Second Annual Report funded by CMS in 2017 
emphasized that GBR targeted both healthcare cost and quality.9 
The model has encouraged more workup and interface with case 
managers in the ED; the objective is to ensure patient safety and 
high-quality care in the community in lieu of admission for 
appropriate patients. These changes were likely contributing 
factors to the increase in the total timespan for the care of an ED 
patient. Future work includes a study on whether and how 
Maryland hospital EDs adopted new strategies or modified their 
procedures for healthcare service delivery in response to the 
implementation of GBR. It remains to be seen if the changes in 
Maryland hospital EDs had or will have a substantial impact on 
Maryland’s healthcare system. 
We found significant differences among the three Medicaid 
expansion states to which Maryland was compared. WV and RI 
had significantly shorter ED1b scores for admitted patients than 
Maryland. Delaware’s score was slightly longer. After applying 
sensitivity analysis using three alternative control groups, we 
found that the difference between Maryland’s ED1b and those 
different control groups remained significant. GBR, a state policy, 
is correlated with longer LOS for admitted patients. In our study, 
the state-level fixed effect is significant. Nevertheless, there may 
well be unidentified confounders that influenced our results. 
According to Benjamin C. Sun, professor of emergency 
medicine at Oregon Health and Science University in Portland, 
“It’s not really fair to compare, say, a public teaching hospital in 
the middle of New York City that sees 120,000 patients with one 
that is in a rural area that sees 5,000 patients.”29 Similarly, it may 
not be fair to simply compare ED scores across states. Our 
comparison across states assumes similar demographics and 
disease burdens, both of which could affect hospital utilization. 
Also, we are assuming similar admission practices across states. 
More particularly, we assume the changes in Maryland inpatient 
census other than affected by the implementation of Medicaid 
expansion and GBR can be controlled by our control group. In 
February 2017, a news report stated that “Maryland ER wait 
times are the worst in the nation,” a conclusion derived by simply 
comparing the ED scores published by CMS Hospital Compare.30 
Viewed in this light, interpreting the significant state-level fixed 
effect obtained in our study without clarifying factors that may be 
unique or particular to each state, might confuse, rather than 
clarify, perceptions of hospital ED performance. 
LIMITATIONS
We acknowledge several other limitations in our study. The 
GBR policy was adopted on January 1, 2014, 10 days after 
Maryland began Medicaid expansion. The control group hospitals 
then had to come from neighboring states that also implemented 
State Number of hospitals* Population (2013)** Hospitals per 10,000 population
Maryland 50 5,928,814 0.084
West Virgina 54 1,854,304 0.29
Rhode Island 11 1,051,511 0.10
Delaware   7    925,749 0.076
*1999-2015 American Hospital Association Survey.19
**Annual estimates of the resident population for states 2013.18
Table 3. Hospitals per 10,000 population.
Variables Coefficient Estimator Confidence interval (95%)
ri -54.47875** (-82.85274, -26.10476)
wv -106.9579* (-175.0596, -38.85614)
de 6.510064 (-8.798204, 21.81833)
t 1.393201** (0.721995, 2.064408)
tt 9.466872** (7.062948, 11.8708)
bed 0.2096206** (0.0893118, 0.3299294)
medicaid -0.6514587 (-1.663111, 0.3601937)
edvperpop -0.0064578 (-0.2680708, 0.2551552)
const 342.5963** (239.5974, 445.5952)
Table 4. Regression results from panel setting with mixed effects and state-level heterogeneity (GLS estimator).
*p-value ≤0.01, **p-value ≤0.001
GLS, generalized least squares. 
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Figure 1. Scatter plot of ED1b scores vs total number of hospital beds.
traditional Medicaid expansion at the same time, thus, limiting 
our control group to WV, RI, and DE. Of these states, RI and DE 
have few hospitals. Another limitation was the incomplete report 
data. Overall, the reporting rate of the control group is 75%. 
According to KFF Total Hospital Reports,31 there should be 290 
Hospital Compare data reports from CMS. However, we found 
only 218 complete reports. It is possible that the missing data 
might have some impact on our results.
Another limitation is the possibility that unmeasured 
confounding factors may have affected ED LOS. Factors such as 
hospital closures, demographics, or shifts in access to care could 
have affected our results. To eliminate the effect of those possible 
confounding factors, the ideal measure would be the volume of 
each hospital’s ED visits. CMS started to collect volume data on 
January 22, 2015. However, some states in our study only started 
to report this measure on November 10, 2016. Therefore, we 
selected features other than volume data and note that we might 
not have been able to eliminate all effects. 
We were also limited in our choice of performance measure 
ED1b, which reflects the total time inpatients spend in the ED. 
Ideally our study would examine both ED1b and the 
corresponding outpatient measure, OP18. However, CMS only 
maintains Maryland State OP18 reports going back to January 1, 
2014. As there is no data for the pre-treatment period, we cannot 
study the impact of GBR on the OP18 measure. Our design 
assumed that residents living in the four geographically close 
Model GBR Effect Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Mixed model 9.466872* (7.062948, 11.8708)
Adding length of report period 8.480697* (7.851343, 9.110051)
Adding registered nurses per thousand population 
and hospital beds per thousand population
8.825362* (7.197024, 10.4537)
Control group with partial WV 10.90678* (6.785388, 15.02817)
Control group without DE 9.85151* (7.934328, 11.76869)
Control group without RI 8.422524* (7.44502, 9.400028)
Table 5. Summary of the sensitivity analysis.
*p-value ≤0.001
GBR, Global Budget Revenue; WV, West Virginia; DE, Delaware; RI, Rhode Island.
bed
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states shared similar reaction patterns to the Medicaid expansion. 
Then, from an aggregate point of view at the hospital level, we 
assumed that our control group could rule out the impact of 
Medicaid expansion on Maryland ED LOS. It is possible that not 
every hospital was affected by Medicaid expansion at the same 
proportion, which might have affected the estimates. Also, our 
secondary finding, the significant difference in time spent in EDs 
across the four states, should be further investigated by analyzing 
data from the Nationwide Emergency Department Database.
CONCLUSION
We conducted an empirical analysis of the impact of GBR 
implementation on Maryland ED efficiency measure ED1b from 
January 2014–April 2016. Our results indicated that GBR 
implementation had a statistically significant negative impact on 
the efficiency performance of Maryland hospital EDs. The mean 
2014 ED1b score was 398.6 minutes, and our study showed an 
average increase of 2.4%, or 9.47 minutes per year, in the first 
two years after the implementation of GBR. We also found that 
the significant state-level fixed effect implies that the same 
inpatient might experience different ED processing times in each 
of the four states that we studied. Further research is indicated to 
explore the dynamics of GBR including the reasons for 
increasing ED length of stay.
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